St. Mary's Law Journal
Volume 21

Number 3

Article 4

1-1-1990

Personal Injury Actions under the DTPA.
Paul N. Gold
George (Tex) Quesada

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, Immigration Law
Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Society Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons, and
the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Paul N. Gold & George (Tex) Quesada, Personal Injury Actions under the DTPA., 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. (1990).
Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol21/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St.
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. Mary's Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact sfowler@stmarytx.edu.

Gold and Quesada: Personal Injury Actions under the DTPA.

PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS UNDER THE DTPA
PAUL N. GOLD*
GEORGE (TEX) QUESADA**

I.

C overage ............................................... 712
A . Effective Dates .................................... 712
B. Proper Parties ..................................... 713
C. Excluded Defendants .............................. 717
D . Personal Injuries ................................... 718
II. C ausation .............................................. 719
III. Survival Actions ........................................ 720
A . G enerally .......................................... 720
B. No Survival in San Antonio ........................ 720
C. Survival in Fort Worth and Houston ............... 721
D. Supreme Court Action ............................. 722
E. Consumer Status .................................. 723
IV. Strategic Considerations ................................ 724
A. Common Law Defenses ............................ 724
B. Special Recoveries ................................. 725
C. Tort Reform ....................................... 726
D. UCC Warranty Theories ........................... 728
V . Conclusion ............................................. 730
This paper discusses personal injury litigation under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA).I Special
* Attorney at Law, The Law Offices of Frank L. Branson, P.C. Dallas, Texas; J.D.
Southern Methodist University 1977.
** Attorney at Law, The Law Offices of Frank L. Branson, P.C. Dallas, Texas; J.D.
Baylor University 1986.
1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.565 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1990). Portions
of this paper were originally presented in Gold and Quesada, PersonalInjury and Survival

Actions Under The DTPA, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED DTPA-CONSUMER LAW
COURSE D-1 (1989); see also D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL, & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER
LITIGATION

Cases, 21

(2.Ed. 1983); Jacks, Personal Injury Damages and Deceptive Trade Practices

TEXAS TRIAL LAWYERS FORUM,

July-Sept. 1982; Mitchell, The Deceptive Trade

Practices Act-1988-89, presented to Texas Association of Defense Council Fall Meeting,
1989.

711

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 21 [2022], No. 3, Art. 4

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:711

emphasis is placed on wrongful death and survival actions.
I.

COVERAGE

The starting point for any discussion of causes of action under the
DTPA is determining which version of the Act applies, who may be
parties to the lawsuit, and what damages are recoverable. This section focuses on effective dates, proper parties, and recoverable
damages.
A. Effective Dates
The DTPA has undergone a number of revisions since its inception
in 1973. Major changes were made in 1979 and 1989.2 The version in
effect at the time of the actual conduct giving rise to the lawsuit governs which Act applies.' Regardless of the text of the statute in effect
when the cause of action matures or suit is filed, one must determine
the appropriate version of the Act in effect when the unlawful conduct
occurred.4 Exemptions and exceptions to the statute,5 elements of
causes of action,6 defenses to claims, 7 and damages recoverable' depend upon the date the unlawful activity occurred.
A prime example is Litton IndustrialProducts Inc. v. Gammage,
which involved personal injuries suffered by a worker as a result of
using a ratchet adapter. 9 Ernest Gammage was employed as a
2. There have been major revisions by each legislative session. See Deceptive Trade Practice-Consumer Protection Act, ch. 61, §§ 1-3, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 149; Deceptive Trade
Practice-Consumer Protection Act, ch. 216, §§ 1-14, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 600; Deceptive
Trade Practice-Consumer Protection Act, ch. 603, §§ 1-10, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1327; Deceptive Trade Practice-Consumer Protection Act, ch. 307, §§ 1-3, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 863; Deceptive Trade Practice-Consumer Protection Act, ch. 883, §§ 1-5, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4943;
Act of June 12, 1985, ch. 564, §§ 1-2, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 2165; Act of June 11, 1987, ch.
280, §§ 1-3, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 1641; Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 380 §§ 1-8, 1989 Tex. Sess.
Law. Serv. 1490 (Vernon).
3. Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex. 1977).
4. Id.
5. Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 368 (Tex. 1987).
6. Mahan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Hall, 648 S.W.2d 324, 334 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist
Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
7. See Riojas v. Lone Star Gas Co., 637 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982,

writ ref'd n.r.e.)(appropriate standard of causation arises under statute in effect when case
arose).
8. See Williams v. 3 Beal Bros. 3, Inc., 628 S.W.2d 531, 531 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1982,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)(damages calculated under statute in effect when acts complained of
occurred).
9. 668 S.W.3d 319 (Tex. 1984).
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mechanic and was using a ratchet designed by Litton Industrial Products when the ratchet failed and Mr. Gammage fell backwards and
sustained serious injuries.' 0 At trial, the injured worker prevailed
against the manufacturer on DTPA theories of recovery.' 1 The jury
awarded more than $700,000 in actual damages and the trial court
rendered a judgment trebling those damages under the DTPA.12 The
manufacturer appealed and argued against treble damages because the
sale of the tool occurred before May 21, 1973, the effective date of the
Act. 3 The Texas Supreme Court reversed the trial court judgment,I4
holding that Gammage had the burden of proving that the defendant
committed an act or practice after the effective date of the DTPA. 5
Since Gammage failed to obtain a jury finding that Litton's actionable
conduct occurred after the Act's effective date, he was not entitled to
DTPA damages. 6
The analysis involved is completely different from the typical statute of limitations analysis. The focus is on the date that the deceptive
acts or practices occurred and not the date that the sale or transaction
occurred. 7 It is very possible for a consumer to pursue a DTPAbased suit for predatory acts which occurred years before the goods or
services were acquired and years before the actual injury. The plaintiff's claim does not mature until the date of injury, but a lawsuit may
be brought for acts or practices which predated the injury.
B.

ProperParties

Inherent to any discussion of a cause of action under the DTPA is
the consideration of who qualifies as a "consumer." By its plain
wording, the statute provides a remedy only to those who seek to acquire goods or services.'I The DTPA's definition of a consumer is:
[A]n individual, partnership, corporation, this state, or a subdivision or
agency of this state who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any
10. Id. at 321.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Litton Indus. Prods. v. Gammage, 668 S.W.2d 319, 324 (1984).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. For instance, in Woods v. Littleton, the sale occurred before the effective date of the
statute, but the deceptive practices post-dated the statute. 544 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex. 1977).
18. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Vernon 1987).
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goods or services, except that the term does not include a business consumer that has assets of $25 million or more, or that is owned or controlled by a corporation or entity with assets of $25 million or more. 9
The wording of the statute is not the final word on the topic. A key

factor is the relationship between the plaintiff and the transaction. z
In this context, the practitioner should consider two types of privity.
Vertical privity is clearly not required. Vertical privity "includes
all parties in the distribution chain from the initial supplier of the
product to the ultimate purchaser.

' 21

As evidenced by Cameron v.

Terrell & Garrett, Inc.,22 and Stagner v. Friendswood Development

Co. ,23 a direct link between seller and purchaser is not necessary. An

injured party may maintain a DTPA lawsuit against any or all parties
in the chain of distribution.24
In Cameron, the consumer sued because of a defect in a home
which he purchased. 5 Instead of just suing the seller of the dwelling,
Mr. Cameron named the real estate broker as defendant because the
26
broker allegedly misrepresented the square footage of the house.
Upholding the trial court's treble damage award, the Texas Supreme
Court declared that an injured consumer may maintain suit against
any person involved in transactions giving rise to DTPA claims.27
Privity of contract was not required.
The Stagner case also involved a series of real estate transactions.28
Here, the homeowners sued the developers of their subdivision even
though the home sites in question were purchased from individual
home builders. 29 The court of appeals upheld the summary judgment
on the grounds that the homeowners were not consumers and were
not in privity with the developers. 3' The supreme court affirmed the
judgment because the applicable version of the Act excluded real es19. Id. § 17.45(4).
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tex. 1983).
Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 456, 463 (Tex. 1980).
618 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1981).
620 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. 1981).
Stagner, 620 S.W.2d at 103; Cameron, 618 S.W.2d at 541.
Cameron, 618 S.W.2d at 537.
Id.
Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 540-41 (Tex. 1982).
Stagner v. Friendswood Dev. Co., 620 S.W.2d 103, 103 (Tex. 1981).
Stagner v. Friendswood Dev. Co., 613 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont),

writ ref'd n.r.e per curiam, 620 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. 1981).
30. Stagner, 613 S.W.2d at 794-95.
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tate transactions.3" In affirming the court of appeals, the supreme
court issued a per curiam opinion disapproving the lower court's
32
holding that privity was required.
The issue of horizontal privity is not as clear. Unlike chain of title
privity, horizontal privity involves the derivative relationship between
the purchaser and the injured party. The term horizontal privity "describes the relationship between the original supplier and any nonpurchasing party who uses or is affected by the product. ' 33 For example, a worker injured by a defective product purchased by his or
her employer obviously lacks any direct contact with the seller but
nevertheless may be a consumer under the DTPA.34
In analogous UCC warranty and product liability cases, horizontal
privity creates standing for injured parties to bring suit. In Garcia v.
Texas Instruments, Inc.,3 the court allowed an injured worker to
bring a claim for personal injuries occasioned by breach of the UCC
implied warranty of merchantability.36 An injured employee can recover even though his or her employer actually purchased the offending product.37

In its decision in Darrylv. Ford Motor Co. ,38 the court resolved the
issue in products liability cases, 39 holding that bystanders have causes
of action for injuries caused by defective products.' In both cases,
the injured parties were entitled to relief even though they lacked direct conduct with the product sellers.
Two Texas Supreme Court cases deal with horizontal privity in the
DTPA context. The first clear statement that derivative lawsuits were
allowed, came in Kennedy v. Sale.4" In the Kennedy case, an employee brought suit against her medical insurance agent for unpaid
31. Stagner, 620 S.W.2d at 103.

32. Id.
33. Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 456, 463-64 (Tex. 1980).

34. See Litton Indus. Prods. v. Gammage, 668 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Tex. 1984)(injured
worker brought suit under DTPA).
35. 610 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1980).

36. Id. at 463.
37. See Muncy v. Magnolia Chem. Co., 437 S.W.2d 15, 16-17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(court allowed employee action).
38. 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
40. Darryl, 440 S.W.2d at 633.
41. 689 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1985).
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medical bills.42 The agent defended on the grounds that the worker

was not a consumer because she neither sought nor purchased the
group health coverage from the agent. 43 Instead, the worker's employer negotiated with the agent and paid the premiums for the policy." The supreme court rejected such a strict reading of the statute
and held that indirect purchasers were entitled to bring suit.45 Relying on a previous holding, the court stated:
Privity between the plaintiff and defendant is not a consideration in deciding the plaintiff's status as a consumer under the DTPA .... A
plaintiff establishes his standing as a consumer in terms of his relationship to a transaction, not by a contractual relationship with the defendant. The only requirement is that the goods or services sought or
acquired by the consumer form the basis of his complaint.4 6
Therefore, a direct relationship between the plaintiff and the entity
providing the goods or services was not required.
This holding was strengthened in the personal injury context by
Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hospital.4 7 In Birchfield, a child
injured by medical negligence was allowed to bring a DTPA suit for
misrepresentations made to her parents. 48 The child did not actively
seek the hospital's goods or services; her parents sought those items
from the defendant.4 9 Nevertheless, the child was a consumer of
those goods and services from the hospital because of her relationship
to the transaction between her parents and the health care provider. °
At least one court has attempted to limit this liberal interpretation
in the commercial context. Home Savings Association v. Guerra, narrowed the statute's reach to protect "innocent creditors"', when the
court stated:
Although a consumer suing under the DTPA need not establish contractual privity with the defendant, he must show that the defendant
has committed a deceptive act which is the producing cause of the con42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
Bank &
47.

Id. at 891.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 892.
Kennedy v. Sale, 689 S.W.2d 890, 892-93 (Tex. 1985)(quoting Flenniken v. Longview
Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tex. 1985)).
747 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. 1987).

48. Id. at 364.
49. Id. at 368.
50. Id.
51. 733 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Tex. 1987).
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sumer's damages. The DTPA does not attach derivative liability to a
defendant based on an innocent involvement in a business
transaction.52

The Guerra case distinguished other Texas Supreme Court privity
cases by noting that the prior defendants had been so "inextricably
intertwined" in the transaction "as to be equally responsible for the
conduct of the sale."' 53 This language flowed from an earlier supreme
court opinion 54 and could have been read as imposing another element on the plaintiff's cause of action. Any thought that this constriction forced the consumer to show that the defendant is
"inextricably intertwined" with the transaction is dispelled by the decision in Qantel Business Systems, Inc. v. Customs Control Co.55 That
case explained that the "inextricably intertwined" analysis is not a
new element of the plaintiff's cause of action but goes to the consumer's standing to bring suit. 56 Thus, all common law theories of
vicarious liability still apply to extend the reach of the DTPA to aggrieved consumers. 7 In the personal injury context, traditional doctrines such as agency and respondeat superior will also provide
adequate bases for including a defendant within the statute's
parameters.
C. Excluded Defendants
The DTPA allows suit against any person who injures a consumer
by committing a prohibited act. 8 The term "person" is defined as
"an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other group,
however, organized."' 9
The statute's broad reach is somewhat limited as several groups are
at least partially excluded from the legislation's ambit. Veterinarians,
for instance, are not subject to DTPA claims for malpractice or negligence. 6' More significantly, health care providers and physicians en52. Id. (citations omitted).
53. Id. (quoting Knight v. International Harvester Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382, 389 (Tex.

1982)).
54.
55.
56.
57.

Knight, 627 S.W.2d at 389 (Tex. 1982).
761 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 1988).
Id. at 305.
Id.

58. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1990).

59. Id. § 17.45(3).
60. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7465a, § 18c (Vernon Supp. 1990).
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joy immunity from DTPA suits alleging personal injury liability for
negligence. 61 This exclusion applies to the employees of health care
providers acting within the scope of their employment.62 The statute,
however, does not exempt doctors and health care providers from allegations of other prohibited conduct. Claims based upon misrepresentations, unconscionable acts, and breach of warranties are not
precluded.6 3 Since DTPA claims are based primarily upon statutory
violations instead of negligence, doctors and hospitals are still subject
to suits under the statute. The bottom line to physician/health care
liability under the DTPA should be that if the DTPA has been violated, liability should lie, unless it is clear that the sole producing
cause of the patient's injuries was the negligence of the defendant.6 4
A good example of this is Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hospital,65 where liability was at least partially predicated upon various
misrepresentations by the hospital concerning the quality of care
rendered.6 6
D.

PersonalInjuries

Despite earlier predictions to the contrary, personal injury damages
are recoverable under the DTPA. A consumer is entitled to recover
all actual damages caused by the unlawful conduct.67 Consistent with
the act's liberal interpretation, a plaintiff can also recover all common-law damages.6 8
A plethora of court decisions authorize recovery of virtually every
category of personal injury damages. Case law entitles injured consumers to recover lost earning capacity, 69 the cost of medical treat61. Id. art. 4590i, § 12.01(a).
62. Quinn v. Memorial Medical Center, 764 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1989, no writ); see also Esterly v. HSP of Texas, Inc., 772 S.W.2d 211, 214 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1989, no writ)(exclusion covers products intimately connected with health care provision).
63. D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION § 202

(1983); Alderman, The Texas Deceptive Trade PracticesAct Meets the Medical MalpracticeAct,
14 CAVEAT VENDOR 34 (1989).
64. Alderman, The Texas Deceptive Trade PracticesAct Meets the Medical Malpractice
Act, 14 CAVEAT VENDOR 34 (1989).
65. 747 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. 1987).
66. Id. at 364.
67. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)-(b) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1990).
68. See Hycel, Inc. v. Wittstruck, 690 S.W.2d 914, 921 (Tex. App.-Waco 1985, writ
dism'd)(damages permitted if evidence shows violation occurred causing damage).
69. See Keller Indus., Inc. v. Reeves, 656 S.W.2d 221, 226 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)(evidence supported jury's award for future earning capacity).
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pain and suffering,7"

and property damage.7 2

Recovery for mental anguish is also allowed,7 3 and it appears that the
physical injury requirement for mental anguish damages has been
abolished.7 4

A plaintiff may recover treble damages under the DTPA upon a
showing that the defendant's conduct was undertaken "knowingly.""
The term is defined as "actual awareness of the falsity, deception, or

unfairness of the act or practice giving rise to
claim."76 A plaintiff may not twice recover damages
or practice.77 In the punitive damages context, the
allow exemplary and statutory treble damages in the
rate and distinct findings of actual damages on both

gence and the deceptive acts or practices.7 8
II.

the consumer's
for the same act
statute will not
absence of sepathe act of negli-

CAUSATION

Under the DTPA, a consumer may maintain a cause of action for
deceptive acts which are a producing cause of actual damages. 79 This
is completely different from the proximate cause standard required in
common law personal injury actions. 80 The DTPA cause of action
70. See id. at 226-27 (plaintiff award for medical care); see also Tom Benson Chevrolet,
Inc. v. Alvarado, 636 S.W.2d 815, 818-19 n.3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)(medical care).
71. See Hurst v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 647 S.W.2d 249, 250 (Tex. 1983)(plaintiff
awarded damages for physical pain and suffering).
72. See Alvarado, 636 S.W.2d at 823 (plaintiff allowed to testify as to value of car).
73. See e.g. Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 368 (Tex.
1987)(mental anguish damages); Brown v. American Transfer and Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d
931, 939 (Tex. 1980)(evidence did not support finding of mental anguish); Centroplex Ford,
Inc. v. Kirby, 736 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ)(DTPA allows mental
anguish damages).
74. See St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex. 1987)(defendant's
negligence and deceptive act caused some damages). Justice Spears observes in his dissent that
the majority opinion overruled Brown v. American Transfer and Storage Co. to the extent that
Brown imposed a physical injury requirement for mental anguish damages in a DTPA action.
Id. at 654 (Spears, J., dissenting).
75. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
76. Id. § 17.45(9).
77. Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 367 (Tex. 1987)(DTPA
precludes recovery of penalties under both DTPA and another law for damages resulting from
same act).
78. Mayo v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 711 S.W.2d 5, 6-7 (Tex. 1986).
79. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon 1987).
80. See Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Corp., 690 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex.
1985)(proximate cause requires showing of cause in fact and foreseeability).
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does not require foreseeability. The only question is whether the consumer's injuries would have occurred but for the defendant's conduct.8 The test in DTPA cases should be straightforward because
"[c]ause in fact means that the ...act at issue was a substantial factor

in producing the injury, and without which such [conduct], no harm
would have resulted."82 Nevertheless, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the deceptive act or practice was a producing cause of injury.83
III.

A.

SURVIVAL ACTIONS

Generally

When a plaintiff dies following injuries to his or her health, reputation or person, the cause of action "survives" to the estate and may be
prosecuted by the heirs or legal representatives.84 Damages for all of
the losses incurred by the decedent prior to death are recoverable.
The survival action should be distinguished from the wrongful death
claim in which the decedent's statutory beneficiaries can bring suit for
their own losses.85 A split of authority exists in Texas as to whether
DTPA cases "survive" to the benefit of the heirs and representatives.
B. No Survival in San Antonio
In First National Bank of Kerrville v. Hackworth, the court held
that a cause of action under the DTPA did not survive to the estate of
an injured party.8 6 The claim involved allegations against the Kerrville Bank for wrongful payment of questionable checks.8 7 Suit was
filed claiming violations of the DTPA, but the bank customer died
before trial.88 The depositor's estate was substituted as plaintiff and
judgment was rendered in its favor.8 9
81. See McKnight v. Hill & Hill Exterminators, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex.
1985)(evidence should show damages caused by defendant's conduct); Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at
549-51 (harm would not have occurred without defendant's conduct).
82. Brown v. Edwards Transfer Co., 764 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex. 1988).
83. See MacDonald v. Texaco, Inc., 713 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1986, no writ)(plaintiff must prove deceptive act or practice was producing cause of injury).
The plaintiff failed to prove that he stopped at the Texaco station because of the motto, "You

can trust your car to the man who wears the star." Id.
84. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.021(b) (Vernon 1986).
85. Id. § 71.001.

86. 673 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
87. Id. at 220.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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On appeal, the bank argued that the depositor's DTPA cause of
action did not survive her death. 9° A divided San Antonio court of
appeals agreed. 91 Noting that the common law did not allow "personal rights" to transcend a plaintiff's demise, the majority concluded
that death extinguishes DTPA actions. 92 Reasoning that the DTPA is
primarily a punitive statute, the court relied upon several cases holding that punitive damage actions do not survive to benefit the estate. 93
Additionally, the court held that the estate and its representatives
were not "consumers" and thus were not entitled to a DTPA
judgment.94
A three-judge dissent would have allowed survival of the cause of
action on the theory that the DTPA is not a punitive statute but is
instead remedial. 95 As such, the common law would have allowed the
survival action. 96 Thus, the dissent would have reached the "con-

sumer" question and held that the estate was a party protected by the
97
statute.

C. Survival in Fort Worth and Houston
Thomes v. Porter9" and Mahan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Hall9 9 differ

sharply from the San Antonio court of appeals' holding. Thomes involved defects in the construction of a home." Before suit was filed,
the homeowner passed away but the claim was pressed by the executrix of the estate.' 01 Judgment was rendered in the estate's favor and
on appeal the issue was whether the estate had the right to bring
DTPA claims."0 2 Noting that the legislation itself did not provide for
survival of the causes of action, the Fort Worth court of appeals
90. First Nat'l Bank of Kerrville v. Hackwortfi, 673 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1984, no writ).
91. Id. at 218, 224.
92. Id. at 220-21.
93. Id. (citing Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1980)).
94. First Nat'l Bank of Kerrville v. Hackworth, 673 S.W.2d, 218, 221 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1984, no writ).
95. Id. at 227 (Tijerina, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 226-27 (common law requires survival of cause of action).
97. Id. The dissent believed the estate had a cause of action. Id.
98. 761 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
99. 648 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
100. Thomes, 761 S.W.2d. at 593.
101. Id.
102. Thomes v. Porter, 761 S.W.2d 592, 593 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1988, no
writ)(appellant contended appellee not consumer under DTPA).
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looked at the statute's liberal construction and genesis.10 3 The court
observed that the DTPA constitutes a vehicle for suits founded on
breaches of warranty and fraud and held that the right to recover
under the Act passed on to the estate."° This holding furthered the
statutory goal of encouraging private actions against unlawful
actions. 05
The Mahan Volkswagen case arose when the brakes of a 1973 Hornet allegedly failed, sending the driver into a fatal collision with a
utility pole.'0 6 The driver's family sued the manufacturer and distributor based on strict liability and the DTPA.10 7 Without much fanfare, the Houston court of appeals, First District, held that the estate
could bring a DTPA claim.10 The court properly pointed out that
the only cause of action which survived is the estate's claim. 109 Thus,
treble damages are available only for a decedent's physical pain,
mental anguish, funeral expenses, and property damage." 0
D. Supreme Court Action
The Texas Supreme Court may have indicated the resolution to the
split in authorities. In Hofer v. Lavender, the Texas Supreme Court
held that claims for punitive damages survived against the beneficiary
of an estate."' The decision distinguishes survival actions from
wrongful death actions" 2 and explicitly permits sanctions against an
estate for the decedent's misdeeds." 3 Thus, even if one accepts the
San Antonio court of appeals' reasoning that the statute is punitive
and not remedial, DTPA actions should survive to benefit the injured
decedent's estate.
This question exists only because the supreme court failed to act
when it had the question squarely before it. Shell Oil Co. v. Chapman
involved a situation where Shell Oil Company mistakenly sold light103. Id. at 594.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Mahan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Hall, 648 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 333.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 332-33.
111. 679 S.W.2d 470, 475 (Tex. 1984).
112. Id.
113. Id.
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weight motor oil in heavy-weight containers."14 Bobby and Nonie
Chapman, owners of several diesel trucks, purchased the mislabeled
products which damaged their trucks.11 5 Mr. Chapman died before
suit was filed." 6 His widow filed the lawsuit and alleged violations of
the DTPA. 7 Judgment was entered in favor of Mrs. Chapman, and
on appeal the defendant argued that the widow could not recover
under the DTPA because those damages do not survive to the estate."' 8 The supreme court agreed to hear the case, but did not grant
the writ of error on that point. ' 9 The court chose not to discuss
whether the DTPA damages survived to Mr. Chapman's estate, and
instead reserved opinion for another day on that aspect of the case.' 2 0
E.

Consumer Status

It is important to recall that only consumers may bring a cause of
action under the DTPA. This concept was underscored in March v.
Thiery, where the children of a deceased homeowner brought warranty-based DTPA actions for defects in the house.' 2 ' The children
were not urging suit on behalf of the estate, but in their own right as
heirs of their mother's estate. 2 2 The heirs had the right to bring common law suits for breach of warranties, but were not entitled to assert
their claims for attorneys' fees under the DTPA. 2 3 Their ability to
bring the common law warranty actions arose from their status as coowners of the home.' 24 The DTPA suit for attorneys' fees, however,
was disallowed because the children were not themselves consumers.' 25 Holding that the heirs had acquired the property through descent and distribution instead of purchase or lease, the court would
not allow an action for attorneys' fees.' 26
The March case should be contrasted against the Mahan Volks114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

682 S.W.2d 257, 258 (Tex. 1984).
Id. at 258-59.
Id. at 258.
Id.
Id. at 259.
S and R Oil Co. v. Chapman, 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 540, 541 (Sept. 5, 1984).
Shell Oil Co. v. Chapman, 682 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex. 1984).
729 S.W.2d 889, 896 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
Id. at 893.
Id. at 896.
Id. at 893.
March v. Thiery, 729 S.W.2d 889, 896 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
Id.
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wagen case. 127 In the Mahan case, the court held that a decedent's
consumer status allows the heirs and beneficiaries to maintain a
DTPA claim on behalf of the estate. 128 Once an individual becomes a
consumer under the Act, the survivors need not independently meet
the test before pursuing a DTPA action. 129 Thus, a decedent's consumer status is imputed to his or her heirs and beneficiaries to the
extent that they pursue the claims which would have been available
130
had the decedent lived.
IV.

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

A number of considerations will arise which may affect the decision
to pursue claims for personal injuries under the DTPA. This section
addresses several of these concerns.
A.

Common Law Defenses

The DTPA excludes common-law defenses. Since the DTPA is a
creature of statute, any defenses must be contained in that legislation. 31 The DTPA did not incorporate common-law defenses into its
statutory scheme. The Texas Supreme Court has stated that:
The DTPA does not represent a codification of the common-law. A
primary purpose of the enactment of the DTPA was to provide consumers a cause of action for deceptive trade practices without the burden of proof and numerous defenses
encountered in a common law
32
fraud or breach of warranty suit. 1
The DTPA does not contain defenses regularly used against personal
injury claimants. Most significantly, contributory negligence is not
included. 3 3 As a result, absent legislative recognition, common law
defenses are not applicable to a DTPA cause of action.
The failure to provide adequate notice and an offer of settlement is
127. Mahan Volkswagen, Inc., v. Hall, 648 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]

1982, writ ref'd n.r.e).
128. Id. at 333.
129. Id.

130. Id.
131. Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980).

132. Id.
133. Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Beach, Inc., 733 S.W.2d 251, 264 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see infra notes 162-164 and accompanying text (common
law defenses and comparative negligence apply to DTPA claims arising after September 1,
1989).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol21/iss3/4

14

Gold and Quesada: Personal Injury Actions under the DTPA.

1990]

PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS

one of the only effective statutory defenses to a DTPA-based personal
injury suit.13 4 As a prerequisite to obtaining treble damages, an injured consumer must provide written notice of his intent to sue under
the DTPA and make an offer to settle. 135 This provision seeks to increase settlements and discourage litigation. 136 Failure to give adequate notice and an offer to settle provides a defense to the consumer's
claim for treble damages. 137
B.

Special Recoveries

Two types of recovery, typically unavailable to personal injury
claimants, may lead a consumer to file a personal injury claim under
the DTPA. First, a successful plaintiff can recover up to three times
the amount of actual damages. 13' A consumer need only prove the
conduct was committed "knowingly." ' 39 This rather ambiguous term
requires the injured party to prove that the actor had "actual awareness of the falsity, deception, or unfairness of the act or practice,''4°
but may be inferred from objective evidence."'4 Proof of willful conduct is not required. 142 The consumer does not have to introduce evidence of the defendant's state of mind; this element may be proven by
showing that a reasonable person would have "actually" known of the
143
effects of their conduct.
Injured plaintiffs may also recover attorneys' fees.144 While this element of damages is typically not available to personal injury claimants,"' it is allowed under statutory causes of action. 46 Of course,
the consumer bears the burden to show that the attorneys' fees were
134. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.505 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1990).
135. Id.
136. Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Valencia, 679 S.W.2d 29, 36 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1984), aff'd, 690 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. 1985).

137. Blumenthal v. Ameritex Computer Corp., 646 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1983, no writ); Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Geffert, 614 S.W.2d 843, 845 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e).
138. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
139. Id.
140. Id. § 17.45(9).
141. Id.
142. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc. v. Luna, 653 S.W.2d 892, 897 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd on other grounds, 667 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. 1984).
143. Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Gonzales, 686 S.W.2d 715, 718 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1985, writ dism'd).
144. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (Vernon 1987).
145. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 414 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex.
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both reasonable and necessary in light of the work performed. 14 7 Spe48
cial care, however, should be taken in contingent fee arrangements. 1
A difficult situation could arise where DTPA based causes of action
are combined with causes of action which do not allow recovery of
attorneys' fees. In those cases, some courts require consumers to segregate the amount of work done on the causes of action where attorneys' fees are recoverable from work performed on causes of action
where they are not recoverable.' 49 The better reasoned view, however, does not require segregation of attorneys' fees when the causes
of action arise out of the same transaction or are intertwined with one
another. 150
C.

Tort Reform

The provisions of the Texas Legislature's 1987 "tort reform" do not
apply to lawsuits predicated on the DTPA if those suits arise from
deceptive acts or practices committed prior to September 1, 1989."'
The tort reform package exempted suits under the DTPA. 52 Thus,
as previously discussed, the version of the DTPA in effect at the time
that the deceptive acts or practices occurred will determine the version of the Act governing the lawsuit. 53 Since the 1989 amendments
1967); Commonwealth Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 678 S.W.2d 278, 285 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
146. International Armanent Corp. v. King, 686 S.W.2d 595, 599 (Tex. 1985); Flenniken
v. Longview Bank & Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex. 1983).
147. Chrysler Corp. v. Schuenemann, 618 S.W.2d 799, 807-08 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bavarian Autohaus, Inc. v. Holland, 570 S.W.2d 110, 116
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ).
148. Fairmount Homes, Inc. v. Upchurch, 704 S.W.2d 521, 526 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.]), aff'd on other grounds, 711 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1986); King v. Ladd, 624 S.W.2d
195, 198 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ). For an example of recovery of attorneys' fees
under a contingent fee contract, see March v. Thiery, 729 S.W.2d 889, 897 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
149. Crow v. Central Soya Co., 651 S.W.2d 392, 396 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Bray v. Curtis, 544 S.W.2d 816, 820 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
150. Village Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Porter, 716 S.W.2d 543, 552 (Tex. App.-Austin
1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); De La Fuente v. Home Savings Ass'n, 669 S.W.2d 137, 146 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
151. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.001-.017, 41.001-.009 (Vernon
Supp. 1990)(tort reform legislation).
152. Id. §§ 33.002(2), 41.002(b)(1).
153. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
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to the DTPA become effective on September 1, 1989,154 all suits predicated on acts or practices occurring before that date are subject to the
1987 version of the DTPA.
Two significant areas in the tort reform package will affect the
DTPA. First, under Chapter 41.003 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, a consumer's right to punitive damages will be limited to
an amount "not [to] exceed four times the amount of actual damages
or $200,000, which ever is greater."' 55 Second, common law defenses
will become available in a personal injury suit under the DTPA.
This drastic limitation on punitive damages may significantly restrict a claimant's rights to obtain exemplary damages against grossly
negligent defendants. Moreover, the consumer will now need to meet
a stricter standard of proof in order to obtain punitive damages in
DTPA-based documents. Under the pre-tort reform standard, punitive damages were allowed whenever the jury found that a defendant's
conduct evidenced such an entire lack of care as to indicate that the
act was a result of conscious indifference to the rights, welfare, or
safety of persons affected by it. 56 Prior to September 1, 1987, Wil8
liams v. Steves Industries, Inc.,

57

and Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls,1

allowed objective proof of gross negligence.
Tort reform now defines gross negligence as "[m]ore than momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence, or error of judgment. It means
such an entire want of care as to establish that the act or omission was
the result of actual conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or wel'
fare of the person affected." 159
The new statute requires additional
evidence of gross negligence but does not specify what new proof is
required. The old "some care" standard"6 was not codified in the
new law. Previous commentators have indicated that direct evidence

154. Act of May 29, 1989, ^h. 380, § 3, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 6 (Vernon). The
statute applies to all actions or claims "commenced" on or before the September 1, 1989 effective date. Pre-suit notice which is given pursuant to section 17.505 of the Texas Business and
Commerce Code is considered "commencing" the lawsuit for purposes of determining the
applicability of the amendments so long as suit was brought within 120 days of the letter. Id.
155. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.007 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
699 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Tex. 1985).
616 S.W.2d 911, 922 (Tex. 1981).
TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001(5) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 825, 828-29 (Tex. 1964).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

17

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 21 [2022], No. 3, Art. 4

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:711

of the defendant's subjective state of mind is not required. 6 ' Thus, so
long as the defendant's actual state of mind can be inferred by the
trier of fact, objective evidence is still appropriate.
The second significant area which tort reform brings to DTPA
practice is the availability of common law defenses. Under the new
Comparative Responsibility Act, 162 a plaintiff's contributory negligence may be submitted to the jury to be considered when determining the percentage of responsibility. 63 Prior to September 1, 1989,
common law defenses were not available to defeat a DTPA claimant's
lawsuit. Application of the new Comparative Responsibility Act to
DTPA lawsuits will bring a potent weapon to the defendant's
arsenal. I64

D. UCC Warranty Theories
The Uniform Commercial Code provides an alternative remedy to
strict liability in tort with respect to injuries suffered from a defective
product. 65 Breaches of the UCC warranties constitute prohibited
conduct within the DTPA. 66 A perfect example of this is Garcia v.
Texas Instruments Inc., wherein an action for personal injuries arose
67
from an alleged breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.
Major disadvantages of bringing an action under the UCC rather
than as a product liability claim are that the statute of limitations runs
from the date of sale. 168 Additionally, the UCC does not provide a
"discovery rule" provision for avoiding the bar.' 69 Further, the failure to comply with the notice requirements of the UCC may be used
as a defense to the injured consumer's lawsuit. 7 °
The personal injury claimant's burden of proof under a
161. Montford and Barber, 1987 Texas Tort Reform: The Quest For A Fair And More
Predictable Texas Civil Justice System - Part 2, 25 HoUs. L. REV. 245, 319 (1988).
162. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.012 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
163. Id.
164. See supra footnotes 151-63 and accompanying text.
165. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.314 -.315 (Tex. UCC)(Vernon 1968).
166. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2) (Vernon 1987).

167. 610 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Tex. 1980).
168. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725 (Tex. UCC)(Vernon 1968).
169. Fitzgerald v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 683 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
170. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.607(c)(1) (Vernon 1968); see also McLain v.
Hodge, 474 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(defendent argued
that he had not gotten timely notice).
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DTPA/UCC warranty case is somewhat murky. In Fitzgerald v.
CaterpillarTractor Co., '' summary judgment was upheld against a

plaintiff who claimed to have suffered substantial personal injuries
from a defective forklift blade assembly.' 72 The plaintiff sued solely
on a breach of the implied warranty of fitness.' 73 The court held that
a plaintiff must prove that on the date of manufacture the product in
question was not merchantable or fit for its purpose.'7 4
The Texas Supreme Court made the burden of proof even more
onerous in Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp.'75 In that case, Plas-Tex
asserted a claim against U.S. Steel for indemnity resulting from
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and the DTPA resulting from the use of defective polyester resins used to manufacture
swimming pools.' 76 The supreme court held that a plaintiff seeking to
prove a product failed to comply with an implied warranty of
merchantability must show, at least circumstantially, that the product
failed because of something the seller did to it before placing the item
in the stream of commerce.' 77 The product must be defective meaning "a condition of the goods that renders them unfit for the ordinary
purposes for which they are used because of a lack of something necessary for adequacy."'' 78 This definition, when used in an implied
warranty of merchantability case is different than when used in a
79
strict liability case. 1
Prior to Plas-Tex, at least one appellate court held that it was not
necessary for a personal injury plaintiff asserting a breach of implied
warranty to show that the product was defective. 8 ° The Plas-Tex
decision expressly disapproved this prior formulation' 8' and stated
that the new test applies whether personal injuries or economic losses
171. 683 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
172. Id. at 163.

173. Id.
174. Id. (citation omitted); Clark v. De Laval Separator Corp., 639 F.2d 1320, 1326 (5th
Cir. 1981); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 (Vernon 1968).

175. 772 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Tex. 1989).
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id. at 443-45.
Id. at 444 n.4.
Bernard v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 691 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985,

writ ref'd n.r.e.).
180. Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U. S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex. 1989).
181. Id. n.6.
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are involved. 182
A plaintiff asserting a breach of implied warranty of
merchantability does not have to use direct or expert opinion testimony to show that the goods had a defect. Under Plas-Tex, the
breach of the implied warranty can be proven by circumstantial evidence showing that the goods were used properly. 183 However, since
the implied warranties only apply when the product is properly used,
the defendant can show misuse or contributory negligence to rebut
84
the argument that the product is not fit for it's intended purpose.'
V.

CONCLUSION

The DPTA is a fertile and dynamic area for consideration when
bringing a claim for personal injury damages. The DTPA requires a
careful analysis in order to properly apply it, because the Act has been
amended numerous times. The applicable statute of limitations and
scope of permissible recovery are generally governed by the Act that
was in effect at the time of the alleged violation. The same is true for
the classification of acts considered to be deceptive and the entities
that can be sued for such conduct.
The Act is more expansive than the U.C.C. because it pertains to
both goods and services. So long as the parties claiming injuries from
the deceptive acts can demonstrate "consumer" status, the Act has
been liberally interpreted and applied. In this regard, the benefits of
the Act have been extended to individuals who were not the actual
purchasers of items, as well as to bystanders.
Personal injury damages, including damages for wrongful death,
are recoverable under the DTPA. These damages may be trebled if
deceptive acts were committed "knowingly." However, it is now
fairly clear that an individual will not be allowed to recover treble
damages under the DTPA and punitive damages arising from the
same acts or practices. Survival of claims for DTPA damages remains an open question. The defenses to a personal injury claim
under the Act prior to 1989 were limited to a few statutory defenses,
and uncodified common law defenses were not available.
182. Id. at 444. Proof of misuse of the goods is not necessary if the plaintiff relies instead
upon direct evidence. Id. n.5.
183. Id.; see also Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Langley, 422 S.W.2d 773, 780 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1967, writ dism'd)(product must be used according to directions.)
184. Langley, 422 S.W.2d at 780.
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The 1987 Tort Reform Act does not specifically apply to the
DTPA, although practice under the DTPA has been influenced by
these reforms. There continue to be ongoing efforts to conform practice under the DTPA to the reform measures that have recently been
imposed on other areas of personal injury litigation. This is most apparent with regard to comparing responsibility and permitting the defendant to assert other common law defenses, which are now
available for claims commenced after September 1, 1989. The statute
has shown itself to be quite a battle ground for litigants and the legislature, and will no doubt continue to challenge those involved in personal injury litigation.
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